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The Evolving Gift-Leaseback Analysis in Light of
May and Rosenfeld
In a typical gift-leaseback situation, a taxpayer gratuitously
transfers property to an irrevocable trust for the benefit of his minor
children., Upon executing the trust instrument, the taxpayer leases
the property back for use as his professional office. 2 The taxpayer's
rental payments constitute gross income to the trust and will gener-
ally be taxed in a lower income bracket. The taxpayer, as lessee,
then deducts the rental payments as ordinary and necessary business
expenses under section 162(a)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code
("I.R.C."), which provides:
(a) In general
There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and
necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in
carrying on any trade or business, including-
(3) rentals or other payments required to be made as a con-
dition to the continued use or possession of property to which the
taxpayer has not taken or is not taking title or in which he has no
equity.4
Thus, if the income is properly attributable to the trust5 and the tax-
payer is allowed to deduct the rental payments, the net effect is an
attractive intra-family income-splitting, tax-saving device.
The rental deductions, however, are not uniformly allowed.
The Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") continues to oppose the gift-
1 The taxpayer may transfer business realty, such as an office building, or he may trans-
fer the funds to be used to purchase business property and equipment. Generally, transfers to
a trust are more prudent than direct gifts to family members. See R. WESTIN, MIDDLE IN-
COME TAX PLANNING AND SHELTERS § 3.20 (1982).
2 Id. § 3.18.
3 A high earnings taxpayer can redirect family income for a substantial tax savings.
The trust or the beneficiaries will be taxed on the income but at a lower marginal rate and
after depreciation and maintenance deductions.
4 I.R.C. § 162(a)(3) (1976).
5 An effective transfer of income from the grantor to a short-term trust requires compli-
ance with I.R.C. §§ 671-677, enacted by Congress after Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331
(1940), which held the grantor/trustee of a five-year trust taxable on the trust income. The
terms of the trust and the grantor's retained control caused him to be treated as the owner for
tax purposes. Id. at 335. Thus the term "Clifford" trust connotes a trust satisfying §§ 671-677
whereby the grantor avoids taxation on the trust income. The taxability of income in the
gift-leaseback context will not be treated in this Note.
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leaseback transaction by denying the rental deductions under section
162(a)(3). 6 Likewise, the Fourth7 and Fifth Circuits8 disallow the
rental deductions. Nevertheless, a growing majority of courts of ap-
peals, including the Second,9 Third,'0 Seventh,1 Eighth1 2 and Ninth
Circuits, 13 as well as the Tax Court,14 favor the taxpayer and allow
the deductions if certain requirements are met.
A growing body of case law has augmented the statutory re-
quirements of I.R.C. section 162(a)(3), but no consensus seems to
have been reached on the proper criteria to determine whether rental
deductions will be allowed.' 5 Furthermore, Congress has yet to inter-
vene to specify the requirements to deduct rent in the gift-leaseback
situation.1 6 In two recent cases, May v. Commissioner17 and Rosenfeld v.
6 See generally Rev. Rul. 54-9, 1954-1 C.B. 20, as modified by Rev. Rul. 57-315, 1957-2
C.B. 624 (rental payments to a trust by a grantor are not deductible business expenses where
grantor transfers property to a ten-year trust for his children then leases it back).
7 See, e.g., Perry v. United States, 520 F.2d 235 (4th Cir. 1975) (no real business purpose
shown for transaction as a whole therefore rentals not deductible as ordinary and necessary
business expenses), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1052 (1976).
8 See, e.g., Mathews v. Commissioner, 520 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1975) (no deduction of
rental payments where transaction lacked economic reality), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 967 (1976);
Van Zandt v. Commissioner, 341 F.2d 440 (5th Cir.) (obligation to pay rent not the result of a
real business purpose), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 814 (1965).
9 See, e.g., Rosenfeld v. Commissioner, 706 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1983) (upholding deduc-
tion of rental payments where gift-leaseback arrangement substantially altered grantor's legal
rights and interests); see also notes 150-81 infra and accompanying text.
10 See, e.g., Brown v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 926 (3d Cir.) (rental deductions allowed
where required as a condition to the continued use or possession of the gift-leaseback prop-
erty), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 814 (1950); see also notes 31-34 infra and accompanying text.
11 See, e.g., Skemp v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1948) (taxpayer required to
pay rentals even though he voluntarily created the situation and therefore rentals properly
deductible); see also notes 26-30 infra and accompanying text.
12 See, e.g., Quinlivan v. Commissioner, 599 F.2d 269 (8th Cir.) (upholding rental deduc-
tions where law firm met statutory requirements of § 162(a)(3)), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 996
(1979).
13 See, e.g., May v. Commissioner, 723 F.2d 1434 (9th Cir. 1984) (rental deductions al-
lowed where transfer had economic reality and leaseback required for business); Brooke v.
United States, 468 F.2d 1155 (9th Cir. 1972) (transfer of sufficient property interest justified
rental deductions).
14 See, e.g., Lerner v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 290 (1978) (reasonable rentals paid by pro-
fessional corporation to trust were ordinary and necessary business expenses); Oakes v. Com-
missioner, 44 T.C. 524 (1965) (allowing rental deductions where business necessity for
leaseback shown); Serbousek v. Commissioner, 1977 T.C.M. (P-H) $ 77,105 (upholding rental
deductions which met four-prong Tax Court test).
15 See, e.g., May v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 7, 17 n.1 (1981) (Coffe, J., concurring) (noting
the confusion and frequent litigation with gift-leasebacks).
16 The only congressional manifestation appears in a Senate Finance Committee Report
prior to the legislative enactment of the Clifford provisions. It states:
[T]his provision does not affect the principles governing the taxability of income to a
grantor or assignor other than by reason of his dominion and control over the
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Commissioner,t8 the Ninth and Second Circuits, respectively, allowed
the taxpayers to deduct rental payments in a gift-leaseback transac-
tion. Rosenfeld and May raise questions as to the viability of the fac-
tors which courts have traditionally regarded as important when
determining if rental deductions should be allowed under section
162(a)(3).
Part I of this Note examines the development of case law in the
gift-leaseback situation. Part II analyzes the opinions of May and Ro-
senfeld. Part III suggests the appropriate test to be applied when ex-
amining the gift-leaseback transaction for tax purposes, and Part IV
concludes that success in a gift-leaseback transaction depends upon
the state of the evolving jurisprudence.
I. Development of Case Law in Gift-Leaseback Transactions
At a minimum, a taxpayer desiring to deduct rental payments
as an ordinary and necessary business expense must satisfy the statu-
tory requirements of section 162(a)(3).19 First, the rent payment
must be required as a condition to the continued use or possession of
property.20 Second, the property must be used in a trade or busi-
ness.2 ' Third, the taxpayer must not have nor take title to the prop-
erty.22 Finally, the taxpayer must not have an equity in the
property.23
A. Rent as a Condition to the Continued Use or Possession of the Property
The first statutory prerequisite to a section 162(a) (3) deduction
trust .... This subpart also has no application in determining the right of a gran-
tor to deductions for payments to a trust under a transfer and leaseback
arrangement.
S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 365, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
4621, 5006; see alsoTreas. Reg. § 1.671-1(c) (1956). Nonetheless, many commentators have
suggested that the "Clifford" provisions should logically be applied to the rental deduction
issue also. See, e.g., Froehlich, Clifrd Trusts: Use of Partnership Interests as Corpus; Leaseback
Arrangements, 52 CALIF. L. Ray. 956, 971 (1964); Note. Cliford Trusts: A New View Towards
Leaseback Deductions, 43 ALB. L. REv. 585, 594 (1979); Comment, Gij/-Leaseback Transactions: An
Unpredictable Tax Savings Tool, 53 TEMPLE L.Q. 569, 587 (1980); Note, Gifts and Leasebacks: Is
Judicial Conrensus Impossible?, 49 U. CIN. L. REv. 379, 394 (1980).
17 723 F.2d 1434 (9th Cir. 1984); see also notes 130-49 infra and accompanying text.
18 706 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1983); see also notes 150-81 infra and accompanying text.
19 See text accompanying note 4 supra.
20 Id; see also Quinlivan v. Commissioner, 599 F.2d 269, 272 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 996 (1979).
21 599 F.2d at 272.
22 Id.
23 Id.
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of rental payments is that the payment be required as a condition to
the continued use or possession of the property. This prerequisite, in
turn, involves at least three inquiries: whether the obligation to pay
is mandatory; whether the payment is reasonable; and whether an
independent trustee is used.
1. Obligation to Pay
Like other business expenses, the taxpayer must incur or pay a
genuine obligation in order to deduct the rental payments.2 4 Rental
payments "[imply] a fixed sum, or property amounting to a fixed
sum, to be paid at stated times for the use of property. '25
Quite early in judicial interpretation of section 162(a)(3), the
Seventh Circuit, in Skemp v. Commissioner,2 6 determined that rentals
were "required" despite the fact that the grantor/lessee voluntarily
entered into the transaction. 27 In Skemp, a physician deeded his office
building to an irrevocable, twenty-year trust to benefit his wife and
minor child. An independent trust company, as trustee, simultane-
ously entered into a ten-year lease with the physician, charging a
$500 monthly rental.2 8 The Seventh Circuit upheld the business ex-
pense deductions because the taxpayer had a legal obligation to pay
the fixed rental, and the trustee had a continuing fiduciary obliga-
tion to collect it.29 Furthermore, the transaction involved a bona fide
change in the taxpayer's economic status.30
Similarly, the Third Circuit, in Brown v. Commzssioner,31 upheld
the taxpayers' deductions of rents and royalties paid to a trust bene-
fiting the taxpayers' children. The taxpayers, engaged in mining op-
erations, conveyed property to an independent trustee who, pursuant
to a prior understanding, leased the land back to the taxpayers. 32
The court found it significant that the trustee, a "new independent
owner, " 33 created the legal obligation to pay rent as a prerequisite to
the continued use of the property, whether or not the taxpayers' min-
24 See, e.g., 4AJ. MERTENS, THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 25.108 (rev. ed.
1979).
25 Duffy v. Central R.R., 268 U.S. 55, 63 (1925).
26 168 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1948).
27 Id. at 600.
28 Id. at 599.
29 Id. at 600.
30 -Id.
31 180 F.2d 926 (3d Cir.), ceri. denied, 340 U.S. 814 (1950).
32 Id. at 927.
33 Id. at 929.
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ing business generated income.34
2. Reasonable Rental
Deductions are allowed for reasonable rental payments only,
since amounts in excess of a reasonable rent are not "required"
within the meaning of section 162(a) (3).3 5 Reasonable rentals are the
product of an arm's length negotiation.3 6 In a gift-leaseback case,
however, the bargaining may occur among family members. There-
fore, it is necessary to determine if the rentals exceed that amount
which would result if the parties bargained as total strangers.3 7 Con-
sequently, courts have historically judged intra-family income-split-
ting devices with strict scrutiny.38
In Kirschenmann v. Westover,3 9 a taxpayer who engaged in farming
operations purchased the land he previously had leased and con-
veyed it to his minor daughter; the taxpayer's brother was appointed
guardian of the daughter's estate.4° In a subsequent leaseback, the
taxpayer paid $19,412.54 in rent, compared to the $1050.00 payment
required under the original lease .4  The Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, finding the rents unreasonably excessive, denied the
deduction since such rentals were not for the continued use of the
business property.42
Similarly, if the taxpayer fails to prove the reasonableness of the
rental payments, by independent appraisals, expert testimony, or
other evidence, the deduction will be denied.43 Failure to produce
34 Id.
35 "[P]ayments in excess of reasonable rent made pursuant to an agreement between
closely related parties which was not the product of arm's length negotiation are not deemed
'required' and thus are not deductible under Section 162(a)(3)." Sparks Nugget, Inc. v. Com-
missioner, 458 F.2d 631, 634 (9th Cir. 1972); see, e.g., 4AJ. MERTENS, supra note 24, § 25.110
at 493.
36 4A J. MERTENS, supra note 24, § 25.110, at 493.
37 Id.
38 See Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280, 291 (1946) (transactions between husband
and wife subject to special scrutiny); Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 335 (1940) (strict
scrutiny necessary where grantor is trustee and his family members are beneficiaries).
39 225 F.2d 69 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 834 (1955).
40 Id. at 70.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 70-71.
43 In Audano v. United States, 428 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1970), a medical partnership leased
equipment, furniture, and supplies which one of the partners had conveyed to three trusts.
The Fifth Circuit denied the deduction of rental payments, which were based on a percentage
of the partnership's gross receipts, when the taxpayers failed to prove that the percentage was
the going rate for similar equipment. Id at 257.
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such evidence suggests the lack of an arm's length transaction.44 It is
not unusual, however, in gift-leaseback litigation for the parties to
stipulate that reasonable rental has been paid, thus foreclosing the
court's inquiry into this requirement. 45
3. Independent Trustee
To determine whether rent is reasonable and whether the tax-
payer has a genuine legal obligation to pay it, courts focus on the
independence of the trustee. 46 The independent trustee also becomes
relevant in another context. Courts inquire into a trustee's indepen-
dence to ensure that the gift-leaseback transaction has substance and
that the grantor has not retained control over the property.47 Since
both Skemp and Brown upheld a gift-leaseback arrangement with in-
dependent trustees, subsequent cases recognized this distinction as
"strongly indicative of the bona fides of the transfer. '48
In terms of the first statutory prerequisite, 49 the arguments in
favor of requiring an independent trustee are several. If a trustee
lacked independence, he could not be expected to deal with the gran-
tor at arm's length.50 Where a grantor appoints himself trustee, he
might be inclined to exact a payment which exceeded the fair market
rental, thus diverting more income to the trust.5' But a lessee negoti-
ating as a hard-headed businessman would want the lowest rentals
possible. In addition, a grantor/lessee, acting in a dual capacity as
trustee/lessor, may treat the rental requirement casually, paying spo-
radically and without genuine obligation to do So. 5 2
B. The Property is Used in a Trade or Business
That the property must be used in a trade or business requires
that the taxpayer have a valid business purpose when he attempts to
44 Id. at 256.
45 Cf. Ryegate Paper Co., 1961 T.C.M. (P-H) T 61,193 (unnecessary to question reasona-
bleness of rental payments if required for the continued use or possession of property resulting
from an arm's length transaction).
46 See May v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 7, 14 (1981).
47 See notes 99-114 infia and accompanying text.
48 Oakes v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 524, 529 (1965).
49 See text accompanying note 20 supra.
50 See 76 T.C. at 19 (Coffe, J., concurring).
51 Brief for Appellant at 24 n.16, Rosenfeld v. Commissioner, 706 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir.
1983).
52 See Wiles v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 289, 298-99 (1972) (payments not labeled rent and
paid sporadically out of the taxpayer's personal, rather than business, account), aJ'dper curiam
without opinion, 491 F.2d 1406 (5th Cir. 1974).
[19841
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deduct rental payments.5 3 A disagreement exists as to the applica-
tion of the business purpose test to the gift-leaseback arrangement.5 4
The IRS, as well as the Fourth and Fifth Circuits, take an integrated
approach, requiring a business purpose for the entire gift-leaseback
transaction. 55 Other circuits, and the Tax Court, have adopted a bi-
furcated approach, first determining whether the gift was a valid
transfer and then ascertaining whether the subsequent leaseback
served a legitimate business purpose.56 This latter view appears to be
the majority position after Rosenfeld and May.
The Fifth Circuit first used the integrated approach in Van Zandt
v. Commissioner.57 Van Zandt established two Clifford trusts58 for his
children, naming himself as trustee.59 Van Zandt deeded his medical
facilities to the trusts for ten years and two months,60 retaining a re-
versionary interest in the trust property.6' Simultaneously with exe-
cution of the trust agreements, Van Zandt leased the property back
for his medical practice. 62 The Fifth Circuit distinguished the situa-
tion from Skemp, where the trust term was twenty years, the grantor
did not retain a reversion, and the trustee was a bank.63 The court
granted that in Skemp there may have been a business purpose for
conveying the property to the trust, since the grantor transferred
more property than he leased back.64 Since the trust property in Van
Zandt was "irrevocably committed to the possession of the grantor
the moment the trust was created, '65 the court viewed the gift-lease-
53 The business purpose test originated in Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935),
where the Supreme Court struck down a corporate reorganization designed solely to mini-
mize taxes. The Court refused to exalt form over substance when the transaction performed
no corporate or business purpose. Application of the business purpose test has not been lim-
ited to reorganizations. See, e.g., Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960) (interest pay-
ments on cash surrender value of annuity savings bond were without substance); Shaffer
Terminals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 356 (1951) (sale and leaseback not recognizable for
tax purposes), afdper curiam, 194 F.2d 539 (9th Cir. 1952).
54 But see Quinlivan v. Commissioner, 599 F.2d 269 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 996
(1979), where the court questioned the existence of a true split among the courts of appeals
and suggested that the only conflict lies within the Fifth Circuit. Id. at 273 n.4.
55 See notes 57-71 infta and accompanying text.
56 See notes 72-80 infra and accompanying text.
57 341 F.2d 440 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 814 (1965).
58 See note 5 supra.
59 341 F.2d at 441.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 442.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 443.
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back as a single transaction, and finding no business purpose present,
denied the deductions under section 162(a) (3).66
The Fourth Circuit followed Van Zandt in Perry v. United States .67
In Perry, two physicians transferred their one-half interests in a medi-
cal office building to two Clifford trusts, naming a bank as trustee. 68
The taxpayers had prearranged a leaseback to be coterminous with
the trust.69 The court denied the rental deductions, since the obliga-
tion to pay rent did not originate from a transaction with a legiti-
mate business purpose.70 The trustee's independence was "largely
illusory. ' 71 Thus, those courts using the integrated approach clearly
analyze the gift and the leaseback as one transaction, for which a
valid business purpose must exist.
Both Skemp and Brown provided early precedent for a bifurcated
view of the gift-leaseback situation. In Oakes v. Commissioner,72 the
Tax Court recognized the gift-leaseback as two independent transac-
tions. Having determined that the taxpayer made a valid gift to an
irrevocable trust, whereby he relinquished all control, the court
found it unnecessary to require a business purpose for the gift.
"[T]he test of business necessity should be made by viewing the situa-
tion as it exists after the gift is made."'73 The Tax Court continues to
apply this view.74
The Ninth Circuit implicitly adopted the bifurcated approach
in Brooke v. United States, 75 where a taxpayer/physician transferred of-
fices, a pharmacy, and an apartment to his children. 76 The Montana
State Probate Court appointed the taxpayer guardian of the chil-
66 Id. at 443-44. The Fifth Circuit reaffirmed Van Zand! ten years later in Mathews v.
Commissioner, 520 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1975), revz 61 T.C. 12 (1973). The facts in Mathews
paralleled those in Van Zandt, except that Mathews' attorney acted as trustee and the lease
was not coterminous with the trust. Id. at 324. The Fifth Circuit dismissed both distinctions.
Intent on examining the substance of the transaction, the court found it critical that the
prearranged lease assured the taxpayers of effective control over the property. Id. at 325.
67 520 F.2d 235 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1052 (1976).
68 Id. at 236-37.
69 Id. at 237.
70 Id. at 238.
71 Id. "The bank had virtually no function save to hold legal title and to receive and
remit the rental payments arranged by the settlors at the time the trusts were created." Id.
72 44 T.C. 524 (1965).
73 Id. at 532.
74 See May v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 7, 13 n.3 (1981), aJ'd, 723 F.2d 1434 (9th Cir. 1984).
75 468 F.2d 1155 (9th Cir. 1972); see also May v. Commissioner, 723 F.2d 1434, 1436 (9th
Cir. 1984) ("By requiring only that the transfer be grounded in professional or economic
reality, [Brooke] implicitly rejected application of the business purpose test to the gift portion
of the gift-leaseback transaction.").
76 468 F.2d at 1157.
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dren, and as guardian, he collected reasonable rent for the offices. 7 7
The court, emphasizing that the transfer was grounded in economic
reality with legitimate non-tax motives, rendered judgment for the
taxpayer. 78
Likewise, in Quinlivan v. Commissioner,79 practicing attorneys were
allowed to deduct rental payments to Clifford trusts after transfer-
ring their previously-owned office building to the trusts. Examining
section 162(a)(3) literally, the Eighth Circuit applied the business
purpose test only to the "continued use or possession" of the property
without inquiring "into the origin of the lessor's title." 80 The bifur-
cated approach, then, requires a business purpose only for the subse-
quent leaseback, and the motive for the prior gift is largely ignored if
the transfer was valid.
C. The Taxpayer Has No Title To The Property
The requirement that the taxpayer have no title in the property
stems from the proposition that an owner of property cannot deduct
rental payments to himself.81 In a gift-leaseback situation, the gran-
tor divests himself of title when he establishes a trust; legal title be-
longs to the trustee who is subject to equitable duties to the trust's
beneficiaries.82 Since divestiture of title poses little obstacle to the
taxpayer, this requirement of section 162(a)(3) is rarely a source of
litigation. The issue of retained ownership does appear more fre-
quently in the statutory mandate proscribing an equity in the
property.8 3
D. Disqualifying Equity
Although section 162(a)(3) forbids a taxpayer from having an
"equity" in the property, neither the I.R.C. nor the legislative his-
77 Id.
78 Id. at 1158. The Ninth Circuit concluded that "[t]he transfer of a sufficient property
interest justifies. . . the deduction of rental payments." Id. at 1157. The following factors are
relevant in that determination: (1) the duration of the transfer; (2) the controls retained by
the donor; (3) the use of the gift property for the benefit of the donor; and (4) the indepen-
dence of the trustee. Id. In a strong dissent, Judge Ely argued that rentals were deductible
business expenses only if a legitimate business purpose motivated the transfer of the leased
property. 468 F.2d at 1159 (Ely, J., dissenting).
79 599 F.2d 269 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
80 Id. at 273.
81 See May v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. at 22 (1981) (Coffe, J., concurring).
82 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 (1959).
83 See notes 84-122 infira and accompanying text.
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tory defines the term. 84 Clearly, if the "lease" transaction is in fact a
disguised purchase plan, the lessee will not be allowed to deduct the
rental expenses. 85 Instead, the lessee must capitalize the payments,
since he is building up equity in the property.8 6 Likewise, a grantor
who owns the property he purports to lease has a disqualifying equity
under section 162(a)(3). The grantor will have transferred his legal
title to the leasehold. But despite this formal divestiture, two issues
still surface in the gift-leaseback cases: whether the donor's retention
of control causes him to be treated as the "constructive owner," and
whether a reversionary interest in the property, granting a future
ownership, constitutes a disqualifying equity.
1. Retention of Control
To ensure that the gift-leaseback transaction is not a sham,
courts require the transferor/lessee to give up that control over the
property he previously enjoyed as its owner.87 Retained control
merely exalts form over substance, despite the legal terminology em-
ployed by the taxpayers.88 The United States Supreme Court has
long recognized that transactions not grounded in economic reality
will not be recognized for tax purposes. 89
In Helvering v. Clird,9° a husband named himself trustee of se-
84 See generaly Froehlich, supra note 16, at 975 & n.74 (the term equity first appeared in
the Revenue Act of 1916 without explanation of congressional purpose).
85 Cf. Estate of Starr v. Commissioner, 274 F.2d 294 (9th Cir. 1959) (disallowing the
deduction of "rental" payments which were in fact capital expenditures to purchase a fire
sprinkler system).
86 Mathews v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 12, 21 (1973), rev'd, 520 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1975);
see also 4A J. MERTENS, supra note 24, § 25.108, at 479.
87 See Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940), explained in notes 90-92 in/ra and ac-
companying text.
88 "[Tlaxation is not so much concerned with the refinements of title as it is with actual
command over the property taxed-the actual benefit for which the tax is paid." Corliss v.
Bowers, 281 U.S. 376, 378 (1930).
89 See, e.g., Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 610 (1948) (husband's assignments of
license contracts and royalty payments to wife merely "a reallocation of income within the
family group" and not sufficient to shift the burden of taxation); Commissioner v. Tower, 327
U.S. 280, 292 (1946) (family partnership resulted in "a mere paper reallocation of income
among the family members"); Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 336 (1940) (husband's
retained control over family trust made him the owner for tax purposes); Griffiths v. Commis-
sioner, 308 U.S. 355, 356-57 (1939) (creation of corporation to convey shares and installment
payments elaborate scheme to disguise simple sale); Minnesota Tea Co. v. Helvering, 302
U.S. 609, 613 (1938) (money paid to stockholders under plan of reorganization in effect pay-
ment to creditors using stockholders as conduits); Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469
(1935) (corporate reorganization had no business purpose and was merely a device to transfer
shares to taxpayer).
90 309 U.S. 331 (1940).
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curities he had donated to his wife. Income was payable to her over
a five-year period, with the corpus reverting to the husband after
that time. The Supreme Court affirmed the finding that the hus-
band retained such control over the gift that he remained the owner
of the property for tax purposes.9' Thus, the income from the securi-
ties should have been included in the husband's gross income under
section 22(a) (predecessor to 1954 I.R.C. section 61(a)).
For as a result of the terms of the trust and the intimacy of the
familial relationship [the husband] retained the substance of full
enjoyment of all the rights which previously he had in the prop-
erty. . . . [W]hen the benefits flowing to him indirectly through
the wife are added to the legal rights he retained, the aggregate
may be said to be a fair equivalent of what he previously had.92
The Cliord doctrine soon found its way into an intra-family,
sale-leaseback transaction. In W.H Armson Co. v. Commissioner,93 the
Fifth Circuit refused to recognize a construction company's sale and
subsequent leaseback of its equipment to its chief stockholder. In af-
firming the Tax Court's decision, the Fifth Circuit noted that "the
Company's right to use the equipment supposedly sold. . . was in no
wise affected by the alleged transfer of title. . . . It was merely a
device for minimizing tax liability, with no legitimate business pur-
pose, and must therefore be disregarded for tax purposes. ' 94
Retention of control and the doctrine of substance over form
then appeared in the gift-leaseback context. In Van Zandt,95 the Tax
Court found the determinative factor to be the lack of an independ-
ent third party trustee, and based on that alone, distinguished the
prior holdings of Skemp and Brown.96 "Complete control over these
91 Id. at 336.
92 Id.
93 188 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1951).
94 Id. at 533. In another sale-leaseback case, White v. Fitzpatrick, 193 F.2d 398 (2d Cir.
1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 928 (1952), the Second Circuit denied a taxpayer's deductions for
rents and royalties paid to his wife. The taxpayer had sold a patent to his wife and had given
her money to purchase property which he leased back. The Second Circuit stated: "Gift and
retained control must be regarded as inseparable parts of a single transaction.. . . To isolate
them . . . is to hide business reality behind paper pretense." Id. at 400. The court distin-
guished Skemp and Brown, noting that in those cases the independent trusteeship was a crucial
factor, and the leases were not coterminous with the trusts. Id. at 401 n.1, 402 n.2.
95 40 T.C. 824 (1963), aft'd, 341 F.2d 440 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 814 (1965).
96 Id. at 830. The Tax Court also distinguished Albert T. Felix, 21 T.C. 794 (1954). In
Felix, the taxpayers established an irrevocable trust for their children and transferred $6000
to the corporate trustee. The trustee used the money to purchase and lease back the tax-
payer's mining equipment. The taxpayers were allowed to deduct the rentals as ordinary and
necessary business expenses. Id. at 804.
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trusts is in the hands of [the grantor], who is the sole trustee and will
continue as such until he dies, becomes incapacitated, resigns or is
removed. ' 97 Since the transfers and the leases lacked economic real-
ity, the deductions were disallowed. 98
After Van Zandt, the inquiry into whether the grantor retained
control over the donated property became an inquiry into whether
an independent trustee existed.99 Many cases turned on this factor
alone, since courts believed it to be a prerequisite to deductibility of
rentals under section 162(a)(3).100 Courts focused on two facets of
independence: the subjective relationship of the trustee to the gran-
tor and the actual powers given to and exercised by the trustee.
The relationship between the grantor and the trustee can take
many forms. At one end of the spectrum, the grantor may name
himself trustee. The bare change in legal title however may not be
enough to divest the owner of control over the property, and the
rental deduction will be disallowed.l °l As sole trustee, a grantor who
exercises broad powers of management and investment over the
property retains inordinate control despite the imposition of fiduci-
ary duties.10 2 But, sufficient independence may exist where the gran-
tor is appointed trustee under a court supervised guardianship.10 3 At
the other end of the spectrum, use of a bank or trust company as
trustee carries a strong presumption of independence, since such an
institution would be unlikely to act under the grantor's influence. 104
97 40 T.C. at 830.
98 Id. at 831.
99 See May v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 7, 25 (1981) (Coffe, J., concurring).
100 See, e.g., Brooke v. United States, 468 F.2d 1155, 1157 (9th Cir. 1972); Penn v. Com-
missioner, 51 T.C. 144, 154 (1968) and cases cited therein; see also Note, Gifi and Leaseback-
Tax Planning in the Shadows of Assignment of Income and Business Purpose, 62 GEo. LJ. 209, 220
(1973).
101 Van Zandt v. Commissioner, 341 F.2d 440 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 814 (1965);
Wiles v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 289 (1972), af'dpercuriam without opinion, 491 F.2d 1406 (5th
Cir. 1974); Penn v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 144 (1968).
102 Penn, 51 T.C. at 152.
103 Brooke v. United States, 468 F.2d 1155 (9th Cir. 1972). But see Kirschenmann v. West-
over, 225 F.2d 69 (9th Cir), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 834 (1955).
104 See, e.g., Quinlivan v. Commissioner, 599 F.2d 269 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 996
(1979); Skemp v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1948); Duffy v. United States, 343 F.
Supp. 4 (S.D. Ohio 1972), rev'don other grounds, 487 F.2d 282 (6th Cir. 1973); Alden B. Oakes,
44 T.C. 524 (1965); Albert T. Felix, 21 T.C. 794 (1954); Serbousek v. Commissioner, 1977
T.C.M. (P-H) $ 77,105; cf. Evans v. United States, 572 F. Supp. 74 (C.D. Ill. 1983) (court
upheld the rental deductions in a sale-leaseback transaction). The court in Evans found that
the trustee bank was independent despite its previous relationship with the transferor/lessee.
"[T]he use of a Bank, as opposed to one's personal accountant or lawyer, seems to be deserv-
ing of an inference of independence." Id. at 78.
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However, this presumption has been rebutted. 105
Somewhere in the middle of the spectrum are trustees associated
with the grantor: employees, 10 6 friends and relatives, 0 7 or profession-
als such as the grantor's accountant or attorney, acting alone or in
combination.108 Cases have been less than consistent in this area,
thus necessitating inquiry into the second facet of independence, the
actual powers and functions of the trustee. The powers of the trustee
can be gleaned from the two documents involved in the gift-lease-
back transaction: the trust instrument created to receive the gift, and
the lease agreement governing the subsequent leaseback.
The trust instrument will usually enumerate the trustee's powers
as well as any powers retained by the grantor. Generally, if the
trustee's power to manage or invest the property is restricted or sub-
ject to the grantor's control, the trustee lacks independence.10 9 In
addition, a trustee who ignores his fiduciary duties, such as failing to
periodically collect the rent, will not be treated as a "new independ-
ent owner."' 0 Consequently, a showing that the trustee is acting for
the benefit of the trust beneficiaries, as opposed to the grantor,
strongly supports a finding of independence. In Lerner v. Commzs-
sioner,"I for example, the grantor's attorney, acting as trustee, repeat-
edly refused to acquiesce in the grantor's requests for costly
105 See notes 67-71 supra and accompanying text for discussion of Peny. See also Hall v.
United States, 208 F. Supp. 584 (N.D.N.Y. 1962).
106 Commissioner v. Greenspun, 156 F.2d 917 (5th Cir. 1946) (grantor's employee suffi-
ciently independent).
107 May v. Commissioner, 723 F.2d 1434 (9th Cir. 1984) (grantor and friend independ-
ent); John T. Potter, 27 T.C. 200 (1956) (grantor's wife and father in conjunction with gran-
tor's accountant sufficiently independent). But see Kirschenmann v. Westover, 225 F.2d 69
(9th Cir.) (grantor's brother as appointed guardian not independent),cert. denied, 350 U.S. 834
(1955); Chace v. United States, 303 F. Supp. 513 (M.D. Fla. 1969) (wife and brother-in-law
not independent), afdper auriam, 422 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1970); Furman v. Commissioner, 45
T.C. 360 (1966) (wife lacked independence), af'dper curiam, 381 F.2d 22 (5th Cir. 1967).
108 Rosenfeld v. Commissioner, 706 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1983) (grantor's accountant, attor-
ney, and later beneficiary daughter adequately independent); Lerner v. Commissioner, 71
T.C. 290 (1978) (grantor's attorney independent); John T. Potter, 27 T.C. 200 (1956) (gran-
tor's wife and father in conjunction with grantor's accountant sufficiently independent). But
see Audano v. United States, 428 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1970) (grantor, attorney, and accountant
lacked requisite independence).
109 See, e.g., Van Zandt v. Commissioner, 341 F.2d 440, 443 (5th Cir.),cert. denied, 382 U.S.
814 (1965); Hall v. United States, 208 F. Supp. 584, 587 (N.D.N.Y. 1962); Penn v. Commis-
sioner, 51 T.C. 144, 151-52 (1968).
110 See, e.g., Audano v. United States, 428 F.2d 251, 258 (5th Cir. 1970) (trustees failed to
exercise ordinary duties of a fiduciary); Wiles v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 289, 298-99 (1972)
(informality of rental arrangement evidence of grantor's retained control), adpr uram with-
out opinion, 491 F.2d 1406 (5th Cir. 1974).
11 71 T.C. 290 (1978).
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improvements, questionable investments, or loans at favorable inter-
est rates, thus buttressing a finding of his actual independence., 1 2
The lease agreement may also provide evidence of a trustee's
independence.113 Where the essential elements of the lease agree-
ment have been determined by the grantor, some courts have in-
ferred that the trustee's ability to manage the trust corpus may be
merely superficial. Thus, courts have found insufficient trustee inde-
pendence in cases with a prearranged lease or with an agreement
containing terms not arrived at by arm's length negotiation.' 4
The emphasis on trustee independence seems to steer courts
away from their original inquiry - whether the grantor's retention
of significant control over the gift constituted a prohibited equity
under section 162(a)(3). A second inquiry became relevant before
these transactions would comport with the fourth statutory require-
ment of section 162(a)(3). This inquiry questioned whether the gran-
tor's reversionary interest would be a prohibited equity.
2. Reversionary Interest
Whether the grantor's retained reversionary interest is a prohib-
ited equity under section 162(a)(3) depends upon the definition of
"equity." 15 The IRS has consistently maintained that equity en-
compasses a reversionary interest, and some courts have adopted this
112 Id. at 302-03.
113 See Robert F. Zumstein, 1973 T.C.M. (P-H) 73,045, at 202. The Tax Court found
that where the lease provided that rental would remain the same for renewal periods if the
parties failed to agree, it "deprived the trustee-lessor of all independence regarding the trust
res." Id. at 204.
114 See, e.g., Perry v. United States, 520 F.2d 235, 238 (4th Cir. 1975) (lease terms and
conditions established prior to the creation of trusts made trustee's independence "illusory"),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1052 (1976); Mathews v. Commissioner, 520 F.2d 323, 325 (5th Cir.
1975) (trustee's pre-execution agreement assured taxpayers of effective control of the prop-
erty), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 967 (1967); Van Zandt v. Commissioner, 341 F.2d 440, 443 (5th
Cir.) (trustee obligated to convey property the moment the trust was created), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 814 (1965). But see Brown v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 926, 929 (3d Cir.) (prior under-
standing between taxpayers and trustee insignificant), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 814 (1950); Skemp
v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 598, 599-600 (7th Cir. 1948) (even though trust and lease executed
same day, taxpayer did not retain significant control over the property); John T. Potter, 27
T.C. 200, 204, 214 (1956) (royalty payments deductible despite prearranged license agree-
ment for patent transferred to trust).
115 The term "equity" first appeared in the Revenue Act of 1916 with an absence of con-
gressional purpose. See H.R. REP. No. 922, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. (1916); S. REP. No. 793,
64th Cong., 1st Sess. (1916). Commentators have suggested that Congress intended to pre-
vent deduction of mortgage payments. See, e.g., Froehlich, supra note 16, at 975 n.74; Lukins,
Tax Treatment of the Lease with Option to Purchase: Is Allocation the Answer?, 11 TAX L. REv. 65,
68 (1955).
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view,116 which naturally leads to the denial of the grantor's rental
deductions. The Tax Court, however, explicitly rejected such a
broad definition in Mathews v. Commissioner," 7 holding "that the
property in which the taxpayer should have no equity does not in-
clude a reversionary interest, not derived from the lease or from the
lessor, which is scheduled to become possessory after the expiration of
a lessor's term of years."118 Similarly, if the grantor has incorporated
his practice, the professional service corporation would not have an
equity in the leased property even though the grantor retains a rever-
sionary interest.' 19
In Quinlivan v. Commissioner,' 20 the Eighth Circuit adopted the
Tax Court view that a reversionary interest was not a disqualifying
equity under section 162(a)(3).12 ' Reading the statutory prohibition
on equity in conjunction with the requirement against taking title to
the property, the court said that "[t]aken together [the requirements]
were intended to prevent the taxpayer from receiving or improperly
benefiting from the deducted rental payments."' 22 Retaining a re-
versionary interest, to take effect at some future time, provides no
benefit from current rental deductions under section 162(a)(3).
The courts' awkward handling of section 162(a)(3) made gift-
leasebacks uncertain and confusing to taxpayers and practitioners
alike. Taking the initiative to solve the dilemma, the Tax Court de-
veloped a four-prong test based on the factors relevant in many of
the gift-leaseback decisions. 23 In order to deduct rental payments
under section 162(a) (3):
116 See, e.g., Chace v. United States, 303 F. Supp. 513, 516 (M.D. Fla. 1969) (alternative
holding),afdpercuriam, 422 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1970); Hall v. United States, 208 F. Supp. 584,
588 (N.D.N.Y. 1962); Gibbons v. United States, [U.S. Tax Cases] STAND. FED. TAX REP.
(CCH) 1 9365 (D.N.M. 1970).
117 61 T.C. 12 (1973), reu'd, 520 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 967 (1976).
118 Id. at 23.
119 In Lerner v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 290 (1978), an opthalmologist who had incorpo-
rated his practice established a trust for his children. Lerner conveyed his medical office to
the trust, retaining a reversionary interest. The corporation then rented the property back for
business purposes. The court allowed the corporation's deductions under § 162(a)(3), re-
jecting the very application of the equity argument since the corporation rather than the
grantor paid the rent. Id. at 298.
120 599 F.2d 269 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
121 Id. at 272.
122 Id.
123 See Mathews v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 12 (1973),reuld, 520 F.2d 323 (1975),cert. denied,
424 U.S. 967 (1976). The Fifth Circuit reversed Mathews because the gift-leaseback had no
business purpose and was without substance.
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a) The grantor must not retain substantially the same control
over the property that he had before he made the gift.
b) The leaseback should normally be in writing and must re-
quire payment of a reasonable rental.
c) The leaseback (as distinguished from the gift) must have a
bona fide business purpose.
d) The grantor must not possess a disqualifying "equity" within
the meaning of section 162(a)(3). 124
The Tax Court's attempt in the new test to integrate the express
provisions of section 162(a)(3) with the case law as it had developed
has proven fairly successful.1 25 However, those circuits which require
a business purpose for the entire transaction must necessarily reject
the third prong.1 26 And those circuits which reject the integrated
analysis recognize the validity of the Tax Court test but do not rely
on it as their sole analysis. 2 7 Finally, the Tax Court's decision in May
v. Commissioner'28 exhibits the internal inconsistency within the Tax
Court as to the appropriate significance and necessity of each prong
of the test.' 29
II. An Analysis of the May and Rosenfeld Decisions
In May v. Commissioner,130 the taxpayer and his wife deeded their
entire right, title, and interest in real property to four irrevocable
trusts to benefit their children (the property had previously been
used for the taxpayer's medical practice).13 ' The parties failed to rec-
ord the deed, however, until two years after its execution. 132 Dr.
124 Lerner v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 290, 301 (1978).
125 The Tax Court has followed its four-prong test except where the Golsen rule applies.
Under Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742 (1970), afd, 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir.), cer. denied,
404 U.S. 940 (1971), the Tax Court will follow a court of appeals decision directly in point
when appeal lies in that circuit alone. Thus, in Butler v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 327 (1975),
the Tax Court relied on Van Zandt to deny a taxpayer's gift-leaseback rental deductions under
§ 162(a)(3).
126 See notes 57-71 supra and accompanying text.
127 See, e.g., May v. Commissioner, 723 F.2d 1434 (9th Cir. 1984) (recognizing the Tax
Court's four-prong test but relying on criteria set forth in Brooke v. United States, 468 F.2d
1155 (9th Cir. 1972)); Rosenfeld v. Commissioner, 706 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1983) (employing
the Tax Court test but requiring a change in the economic interests of the parties); Quinlivan
v. Commissioner, 599 F.2d 269 (8th Cir.) (applying the plain meaning of § 162(a)(3) but
using the Tax Court test as a second basis of analysis), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
128 76 T.C. 7 (1981), afd, 723 F.2d 1434 (9th Cir. 1984).
129 The majority opinion in May was accompanied by a concurring opinion and three
dissenting opinions. See also Friedlander, Gij/-Leaseback. The IRS' Misguided Campaign, 19 CAL.
W.L. REv. 288, 295 (1983).
130 76 T.C. 7 (1981), afd, 723 F.2d 1434 (9th Cir. 1984).
131 76 T.C. at 8-9.
132 Id. at 10.
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May and a friend, Mr. Gross, were named trustees and given broad
powers of management over the trust property.13 3 Pursuant to an
oral agreement, May leased the property back at a monthly rental of
$1000.'34 The Tax Court held that the rental payments were deduct-
ible as ordinary and necessary business expenses under section
162(a)(3). 35
In applying its four-prong test, the court dealt primarily with
the first and second prongs.1 36 Initially addressing the second re-
quirement of reasonable rental and a written lease, the court held
that absence of a written lease was not fatal in May, where "the terms
of the lease were clearly understood by the trustees and faithfully
observed by the parties."'' 37 Since the parties had stipulated that a
reasonable rental had been paid, t38 further inquiry into the trustee's
independence was only relevant in examining the grantor's control
(first prong).1 39 The court then turned to the first prong and distin-
guished May from both those cases where the grantor retains a rever-
sionary interest and those cases where the grantor names himself sole
trustee. 40 The court proceeded to find the trustee Gross independ-
ent, based on his feeling of independence and his awareness of the
required fiduciary obligations. Given the size and simplicity of the
trust, however, the execution of these fiduciary duties required only
that Gross inspect the checking account four times to ensure that rent
had been paid.' 4 ' The majority opinion intimated that trustee inde-
pendence might vary according to the nature and complexity of the
trust corpus but left open the question of whether trustee indepen-
dence would be required in every gift-leaseback situation. 42 Clearly,
then, the majority of the Tax Court in May muddled the four-prong
test, disregarding some aspects totally while hedging on others.
Four dissenting judges rejected any finding that Gross acted in-
dependently or performed the required fiduciary duties.' 43 More-
133 Id. at 8-10.
134 Id. at 11.
135 Id. at 15.
136 The court adhered to the requirement of business purpose for the leaseback alone, as
stated in the third prong. The court also dismissed the argument that May retained an eq-
uity in the property since May's children were the only equitable owners of the property. Id
at 13.
137 Id. at 14.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 723 F.2d 1434, 1435 (9th Cir. 1984).
142 76 T.C. at 15.
143 Judges Wilbur and Parker joined in Judge Simpson's dissent which stated, "Mr. Gross
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over, two judges would have dispensed with the necessity of an
independent trustee in the May case.14 4 The Tax Court's inconsis-
tency in applying its four-prong test in May, thereby undermining its
viability, merely added confusion and unpredictability to the evolv-
ing body of gift-leaseback law.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed May, agreeing with the
Tax Court's findings but applying different criteria. 145 The Ninth
Circuit ignored the four-prong test and based its holding on Brooke v.
United States, which focused on "the sufficiency of the property inter-
est transferred" to determine whether rental payments could be de-
ducted under section 162(a)(3).146 The court upheld the validity of
the conveyance which occurred upon execution of the trust instru-
ment. 14 7 The court also affirmed the findings that the grantors did
not retain the same control they had as owners after establishing the
irrevocable trusts, that the trustees were sufficiently independent,
and that the grantor's use of the property was limited to his rights as
a lessee.1 48 Because control over the property had been relinquished,
the transfer had economic reality; when coupled with a leaseback
required for May's medical practice, the rental payments were de-
ductible under section 162 (a) (3).1 49
After May, the future of the Tax Court's four-prong test seemed
questionable. In another gift-leaseback case, however, the Tax Court
rejuvenated its test, which the Second Circuit subsequently adopted.
In Rosenfed v. Commissioner ,150 a taxpayer established three irrevocable
trusts to benefit his children, appointing his attorney and accountant
co-trustees.1 5 1 He then transferred his medical property to the trusts
for a period of ten and one-half years, retaining a reversionary inter-
was not the type of independent trustee who would assure that the trust and lessee dealt with
each other at arm's length." Id. at 34 (Simpson, J., dissenting). Judge Wilbur's separate
dissent found that "[h]is performance was not independent by any stretch of the imagina-
tion." Id. at 37 (Wilbur, J., dissenting). Finally, Judge Chabot wrote that Gross, "the suppos-
edly independent trustee," did not demonstrate any independence. Id. at 41 (Chabot, J.,
dissenting).
144 See 76 T.C. 7, 16 (1981) (Goffe, J., concurring); zd at 41 (Chabot, J., dissenting).
145 723 F.2d 1434 (9th Cir. 1984).
146 Id. at 1436-37; see also notes 75-78 supra and accompanying text.
147 "Under California law the gratuitous transfer of real property can be accomplished by
the delivery of a written instrument, executed by the transferor, which contains language
plainly showing a present intent to transfer." Id. at 1437 (citations omitted).
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 706 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1983).
151 Id. at 1278-79.
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est effective upon expiration of the term.1 52 On the same day that
the parties executed the trust agreement, Rosenfeld leased the prop-
erty back for the entire trust term. 153 The trustees had the power to
manage the property; in essence, they collected and invested the
rental income, paid the property taxes, and filed the tax returns for
the trust. 154 Rosenfeld remained responsible for the mortgage pay-
ments and for maintenance of the property. 55 After four years, Ro-
senfeld transferred his reversionary interest to his wife. 156 Later, the
parties amended the trust agreement to designate Rosenfeld's daugh-
ter, a trust beneficiary, as a third trustee, to extend the trust term and
to shorten the rental period to one year with an option to renew. 157
The Tax Court upheld the deduction of the rental payments,
once again refusing to require a business purpose for the entire ar-
rangement. 158 The court determined that Rosenfeld did not own a
prohibited equity in the property; his reversionary interest was not a
right derived from the lease arrangement, and in any event he had
transferred it to his wife prior to the years in issue.159 Rosenfeld re-
quired the medical property for his practice, thus the leaseback had a
valid business purpose. 160 Moreover, the lease agreement was writ-
ten, and the Commissioner had not objected to the reasonableness of
the rental. 161 Finally, Rosenfeld did not retain substantially the
same control over the property as he had as owner. 162
The Tax Court noted that a prearranged leaseback is at least
implicit in the gift-leaseback situation; a grantor would not part with
his office unless he could be assured of continued possession in return
for the stipulated rental.163 Furthermore, a lease period equivalent to
the trust term did not effectively negate the trustees' powers of nego-
tiation, where the trustees would be unlikely to evict the grantor and
152 Id. at 1279.
153 An independent firm appraised the fair rental of the property to be $14,000 annually,
which Rosenfeld paid. Id. The appraisal also recommended converting a storage area in the
rear one-third of the building into an office space for rent, which Rosenfeld declined to do. ld.
at 1284 (MacMahon, J., dissenting).
154 Brief for Appellant at 6, Rosenfeld v. Commissioner, 706 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1983).
155 723 F.2d at 1279.
156 Id.
157 706 F.2d at 1279, 1288 (MacMahon, J., dissenting). The trust, as amended, required
action by majority vote of the trustees, provided the daughter was in the majority. Id.
158 1982 T.C.M. (P-H) 1 82,263, at 1096.
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 Id. at 1096-97.
163 Id. at 1097.
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could still negotiate a higher rental prior to the lease expiration, as
accomplished in Rosenfeld.' 64 Furthermore, the trustees in Rosenfeld
were aware of their duties and participated more actively than did
the trustees in May 165
The Second Circuit affirmed Rosenfeld and joined the growing
majority of courts adhering to the bifurcated approach. On appeal,
the government had argued that the rental obligation "arose out of a
transaction serving no business purpose, resulting in no loss of control
over the property and having tax avoidance as its sole objective."' 66
The court of appeals, however, following the four-prong test of
the Tax Court, disagreed with the government and found that the
transfer sufficiently diminished Rosenfeld's control over the prop-
erty.167 The court rejected application of the business purpose stan-
dard to the entire gift-leaseback transaction, because imposing that
requirement would deny the rental deduction in every gift-leaseback
case.' 68 Moreover, since Congress has explicitly approved the Clif-
ford trust as a valid income-splitting device, 69 the Second Circuit
determined that it would be unreasonable to require a taxpayer to
have a business purpose to establish the trust. 70 The Second Circuit
proceeded then from the four-prong test to an examination of all the
relevant circumstances and, in particular, to an inquiry into the eco-
nomic interests of the parties. "If their legal rights and beneficial
interests have changed, there is no basis for labeling a transaction a
'sham' and ignoring it for tax purposes."' 17 The court found a suffi-
cient change in the economic interests to uphold the gift-leaseback
transaction. In addition, the court found that Rosenfeld's desire to
provide for his children generated a legitimate non-tax motive for the
creation of the trust, and the business necessity of an office prompted
the leaseback.' 72
Judge MacMahon argued forcefully in his dissent that the gift-
leaseback in substance did not affect Rosenfeld's beneficial interests;
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 Brief for Appellant at 9, Rosenfeld v. Commissioner, 706 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1983).
167 706 F.2d at 1281. "[T]he broad grants of power to the trustees, the concomitant dimi-
nution of Rosenfeld's rights, and the actual independence of the trustees, adequately satisfies
the first element of the Tax Court's test." Id.
168 Id.
169 I.R.C. §§ 671-678 (1976).
170 706 F.2d at 1281-82.
171 Id. at 1282.
172 Id.
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rather, it merely reduced his tax.1 73 MacMahon then chastised the
majority for misconstruing the government's business purpose argu-
ment.' 74 Indeed, the government did not argue that the initial gift
must have a business purpose, but rather, when viewing the transac-
tion as related steps in a single plan, the series of events must have a
legitimate business purpose.' 75 The Second Circuit had previously
denied the rental deductions in a gift-leaseback case,' 76 thus implic-
itly recognizing an integrated approach, but the majority opinion
did not find it controlling.' 77
MacMahon further disagreed that denial of the rental deduc-
tion runs afoul of Congressional intent by excluding a tax benefit to
those persons whose only assets are business property.1 78 Rather, the
inherent unfairness, in his view, rested with persons possessing non-
income producing property unable to take advantage of the Clifford
provisions. 79 In addition, MacMahon refuted the majority's argu-
ment that because the grantor could have leased property from a
third person and deducted the rental payments under section
162(a)(3), he should be accorded the same treatment in a gift-lease-
back context; the potential for exerting control over property given
in trust to family members and leased back sufficiently distinguishes
the two.'8 0 In fact, MacMahon argued that Rosenfeld maintained
control by instructing the trustees not to improve the unfinished por-
tion of the building, by amending the trust, and by appointing his
daughter trustee.' 8 '
III. The Appropriate Test To Determine Rental Deductibility
Rosenfeld and May both exhibit the government's unsuccessful at-
tempts to invalidate rental deductions in a gift-leaseback transaction.
The government contends that a taxpayer must show a business pur-
pose for the gift and leaseback since these events are "designed and
executed as integrated parts of a single plan."' 8 2 Thus, unless the
173 Id. at 1283 (MacMahon, J., dissenting).
174 Id.
175 Brief for Appellant at 10-11, Rosenfeld v. Commissioner, 706 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1983).
176 The apparent integrated approach of White v. Fitzpatrick, 193 F.2d 398 (2d Cir.
1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 928 (1952), is discussed in note 94 supra.
177 The majority acknowledged White only in scattered references but clearly did not base
its holding on it. 706 F.2d at 1281-82.
178 706 F.2d at 1286 (MacMahon, J., dissenting).
179 Id.
180 Id.
181 Id. at 1288.
182 Brief for Appellant at 15, Rosenfeld v. Commissioner, 706 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1983).
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whole transaction is entered into with a business purpose, the ex-
penses incurred should not be deductible business expenses under
section 162(a)(3). Alternatively, the government argues that a gran-
tor/lessee retains such dominion and control over the property that
he continues to be its owner.183 Thus, the transfer of legal title in the
gift-leaseback situation lacks economic reality, and it should not be
recognized for tax purposes.18 4
Underlying each argument, as well as each court's analysis, is
the concern that the gift-leaseback have economic reality: whether
the transaction in substance has effectuated a bona fide change in the
beneficial interests of the parties. If so, then the transaction is not a
sham. "[T]he Government should honor the allocation of rights and
duties effectuated by the parties."' 185
The problem with employing a business purpose test in the gift-
leaseback context is that the two relevant transactions require differ-
ent determinations to prove they are legitimate transactions rather
than tax avoidance schemes. Initially, a grantor will establish a
short-term Clifford trust or will make an outright conveyance of his
entire interest in property to his children. The grantor's motive in
making such a gift must by definition arise from a "detached and
disinterested generosity."' 8 6 The taxpayer, as a parent, wants to pro-
mote the welfare of his children. This motive should be distinguished
from the motive of the same taxpayer as a businessman entering into
a lease.
To prove that a gift to a trust has economic substance, the gran-
tor must show that he no longer exerts the same dominion and con-
trol over the property that he had as owner. 187 In the case of a
Clifford trust where the grantor retains a reversionary interest, two
distinct factors negate a grantor's control: an independent trustee or
a transfer of the reversion. The independent trustee, acting in a
183 Id. at 24-25. Courts frequently reject this argument where a Clifford trust is involved.
Unless the trust fails to comply with I.R.C. §§ 671-677, Congress has provided that the gran-
tor should not be treated as the owner for tax purposes. Applying §§ 671-677 and § 162(a)(3)
in pari materia, some courts will not look behind a valid trust to determine that the grantor
remains the owner for purposes of denying the rental deduction. See Rosenfeld, 706 F.2d 1277,
1281-82 (2d Cir. 1983); Quinlivan, 599 F.2d 269, 273-74 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 996
(1979); see also note 16 supra.
184 Brief for Appellant at 24-25, Rosenfeld v. Commissioner, 706 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1983).
185 Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 584 (1978) (recognizing the validity of
a three-party sale-leaseback transaction).
186 Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285 (1960).
187 See notes 87-98 supra and accompanying text.
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fiduciary capacity, ensures that the gift-leaseback transaction is at
arm's length. Similarly, where the grantor transfers his reversion-
ary/remainder interest, the disposition resembles an outright gift of
property. In that case, the gift transfer has substance and there need
be no added requirement of an independent trustee. 188 The grantor
has effectively relinquished all present and future rights in the
property.
The subsequent leaseback, unlike the gift to the trust, occurs in a
commercial context and is therefore properly within the business
purpose test. In order to deduct rental payments, the taxpayer must
enter into the lease agreement for commercial purposes. A physician,
attorney, or any sole practitioner who requires an office building for
his practice enters into a lease with a business purpose. It is that
simple.
The government erroneously relies on cases like Armston and
White which denied rental deductions for intra-family transfers and
leasebacks because the arrangements lacked economic substance.
Those cases, however, did not involve a trust. As previously men-
tioned, a trust with an independent trustee subject to fiduciary obli-
gations, or a trust composed of property which will not revert to the
grantor, is sufficient evidence of the bona fides of the transfer and
proof that the transactions are grounded in economic reality.
Likewise, the government's argument that transactions designed
as a single plan will not be given independent significance is inappli-
cable to a gift-leaseback transaction. Only where a transaction is a
series of steps designed to circumvent taxation will courts disregard
the intervening event which has no utility or significance apart from
its use as a vehicle to obtain favorable tax consequences. 18 9 In the
gift-leaseback situation, both the gift and the leaseback have legiti-
mate non-tax objectives. 19°
The appropriate test to determine the deductibility of rentals
under section 162(a)(3) in a gift-leaseback situation must ensure that
the transaction is grounded in economic reality. A valid gift need
not have a business purpose; rather, it should divest the owner of
control over the property. A leaseback should be entered into for
commercial purposes. The parties effectuating the leasehold must
188 May v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 7,30 (1981) (Coffe, J., concurring), aj'd, 723 F.2d 1434
(9th Cir. 1984).
189 See Griffiths v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 355 (1939); Minnesota Tea Co. v. Helvering,
302 U.S. 609 (1938); Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
190 See Friedlander, supra note 129, at 299.
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derive their rights from the lease and act according to their legal
status as lessor or lessee.
IV. Conclusion
For the professional doctor, attorney, or sole practitioner who
owns business realty, the gift-leaseback transaction looks attractive
and desirable at first glance. Realistically, however, the taxpayer
should be wary of conveying his property and deducting the rental
payments under I.R.C. section 162(a)(3). At a minimum, the IRS
may assess a deficiency for the rental deductions, forcing the tax-
payer into litigation. And, although the taxpayer may ultimately
prevail, the time and expense of litigation may nullify any advantage
obtained by the transaction.
Moreover, a taxpayer's success in court will depend, quite fortui-
tously, upon the circuit in which his appeal lies and also upon the
state of the evolving gift-leaseback jurisprudence. The requirements
which ensured deductibility of rental payments yesterday may differ
or may even be largely ignored tomorrow. Thus, unless the Supreme
Court rules on the deductibility of rentals issue, taxpayers and attor-
neys must monitor the gift-leaseback situation carefully.
Karen W. Kiley
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